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ABSTRACT:  In a fair, infinite lottery, it is possible to conclude that drawing a 
number divisible by four is strictly less likely than drawing an even number; and, 
with apparently equal cogency, that drawing a number divisible by four is equally 
as likely as drawing an even number. 
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1. Introduction 
 A fair, infinite lottery selects without favor among a countable infinity of possible results, 




select from an infinity of balls, numbered 1, 2, 3, …, such that none is favored. This thought 
experiment has long had a place in analyses of the foundations of probability. De Finetti (1972, 
§5.17) used it to argue against the countable additivity of probability measures. Benci, Horsten 
and Wenmackers (2018) used it to argue for infinitesimal probabilities. 
 Subsequently, one of us (Norton, forthcoming), has argued that the infinite lottery 
thought experiment requires us to discard not just a countably additive probability measure, but 
even a finitely additive notion of chance. Norton’s analysis depends on realizing the condition of 
selection without favor as the requirement that the likelihood or chance of some outcome 
depends only on the sizes of the set of balls favorable to it and the set of balls unfavorable to it. 
Norton’s implementation, the other of the present authors (Parker, 2020) has objected, 
presupposes that chances are the values of a function over the outcome space. Parker has 
presented an alternative analysis, in terms of a comparative chance relation, that restores finite 
additivity (in a comparative form) and also makes every outcome set more likely than any of its 
proper subsets. (For a response, see Norton, forthcoming a, §11.) 
 This note reviews the arguments for each analysis and leaves the final decision as an 
open question. The two arguments depend on different notions of the comparison of sizes of 
infinite sets. Do we compare them better by cardinality or by set theoretic inclusion? Norton’s 




 The precise notion of chance1 invoked here will remain incompletely specified.  The 
paradox is intended to be a motivation to discover which formal properties of a notion of chance 
allow the paradox to be addressed most satisfactorily. 
2. The Paradox 
 A formal condition, ‘label independence,’ asserts that the chance of an outcome, 
specified as a set of numbers, is unaffected by any relabeling that merely permutes the numbers 
assigned to the balls. This condition expresses the fairness of the drawing since a permutation 
preserves the sizes of the sets, both favorable and unfavorable to the outcome. Those sizes are, 
by supposition, all that determines the outcome chances. For example, the outcome even is just 
the drawing of a ball with an even number; and odd is the drawing of an odd number. A 
permutation of the numbering merely switches the numbers on the sets of balls associated with 
the two outcomes according to 1 « 2, 3 « 4, 5 « 6, … It now follows that even and odd 
outcomes must have the same chance, since the outcome set originally labeled even has become 
odd under the relabeling, and conversely. 
 A second condition on the chances is also attractive. The outcome ‘fours’ is just the set of 
multiples of 4: {4, 8, 12, 16, …}. It is a proper subset of even. Thus, whenever we have an 
outcome fours we have an outcome even, but not conversely. Hence the chance of fours should 
be strictly less than that of even. To strengthen this last conclusion, consider the outcome ‘fours – 
2’: {4 – 2, 8 – 2, 12 – 2, 16 – 2, …} = {2, 6, 8, 10, 14, …}. The outcomes fours and fours – 2 are 
 
1 ‘Chance’ here is not intended to imply a notion of objective physical chance like those 
associated with propensity, frequency, or Humean best-systems accounts, nor do we exclude 
such interpretations by fiat. We adopt ‘chance’ as a convenient word distinct from ‘probability,’ 




related by a permutation of labels and so have equal chances under label independence. The 
outcome even is partitioned into just these two outcomes, fours and fours – 2. Hence even and 
fours do not differ by an outcome set negligible on chancy scales, but by an outcome whose 
chance equals that of fours. 
 The analysis so far involves several individually plausible propositions:2 
(1) Label independence. The chances of outcomes in a fair, infinite lottery are unchanged 
under a permutation of outcome labels. 
(2) Containment. Outcome fours has strictly less chance than even. 
(3) Completeness. It is possible to assign mutually comparable chances to all outcomes of a 
fair, infinite lottery. 
The paradox is that these propositions are jointly inconsistent. For there is a permutation of the 
balls that takes those that were numbered even and maps them just to those numbered fours. The 
induced relabelings are: 
2 à 4, 4 à 8, 6 à 12, 8 à 16 … 1 à 1, 3 à 2, 5 à 3, 7 à 5, … 
Read these to say, ‘The ball formerly numbered 4 is now relabeled 2,’ etc. It now follows from 
label independence that if fours has chance X, then so does even. For they are each realized by 
the same ball drawings, but now just labeled differently. 
 The paradox can be escaped by denying at least one of the propositions above. The 
present authors differ, both from each other and from other authors, on which to deny. 
 
2 This is not meant to be a complete analysis of all the implicit background assumptions in the 




3. The Probabilists’ Escape 
 Probabilistic approaches to infinite lotteries escape the paradox by denying Label 
Independence (1). It is well known that if each single outcome {1}, {2}, {3}, … has the same 
chance, then the probability axiom of countable additivity fails. Probabilists have often been 
willing to reject countable additivity in the case of an infinite lottery while still regarding finite 
additivity as essential to coherence (e.g., De Finetti 1972; Benci et al. 2018).  
 In imposing a finitely additive measure, probabilists are changing the problem posed. The 
defining characteristic of this version of the infinite lottery problem is that the chance of an 
outcome depends on the size of the outcome set and its complement; and only these sizes. A 
finitely additive measure violates the ‘only’ condition.  For any set of balls that is both infinite 
and co-infinite, there is a numbering in which that set of balls is the even-numbered set. Once a 
designation of even is made and a specific probability 1/2 is assigned to it, finite additivity 
implies that most other infinite, co-infinite sets cannot have that same probability. Which of all 
possible infinite co-infinite sets in the outcome space can be even and carry the same probability 
is determined by restricting the numberings to a subset of all possible numberings. The 
requirement of these preferred numberings adds structure to the problem in a way that violates 
the ‘only’ condition. For, both set sizes and preferred numberings are now required in order to 
determine the probabilistic chances of outcomes. 
 In short, denying Label Independence (1) does not address the problem posed here. We 
are not suggesting that cardinality and co-cardinality determine chances in other situations such 
as a game of darts with a continuous dartboard. But here, denying label independence does not 




4. The Cardinality Escape 
 One of us (Norton) denies Containment (2) in order to preserve Completeness (3). We 
saw above that the distinctive characteristic of a fair, infinite lottery, label independence, requires 
that even and fours have equal chances (if they have chances at all). This result is only 
unwelcome, Norton claims, if one proceeds with intuitions tutored by finite sets. Among infinite 
sets, a set can have the same size (cardinality) as one of its proper subsets. Cardinalities of sets 
and their complements alone should determine the equality of chances. 
 What results is a novel account of the chances of outcomes of infinite lottery drawings 
that assigns a chance to all sets of outcomes. Completeness (3) is preserved. Finite sets of 
outcomes are assigned various, very small chances. Infinite sets that are co-finite are assigned 
various very high chances. The intermediate case—infinite sets of outcomes that are co-
infinite—all have the same intermediate chance. 
 One might conjecture that this escape is untenable since, in repeated drawings, the 
outcome even should, with increasing chances, occur roughly twice as often as fours. However, 
the chance relations arising from label independence do not support this difference of 
frequencies. That is, n outcomes of even among N drawings has the same chance as n outcomes 
of fours among N drawings (for all N and each n, 0 £ n £ N). Label independence ensures that the 
outcome fours has the same chance as even in a single draw, so neither is favored. By similar 
means, label independence ensures that repeating the drawings continues equally to favor equal 
frequencies of fours and even. While this outcome is unlike the corresponding result in familiar 
probability theory, it is only an unfamiliar result of an unfamiliar calculus. It is no more curious 





5. The Containment Escape 
 The other of us (Parker) defends the alternative of denying Completeness (3). Perhaps we 
are not justified in supposing that all outcome sets can be mapped into one linearly ordered set of 
things called chances. Instead, we can define a partial relation of ‘is at most as likely as’ between 
outcome sets, a relation that satisfies label independence and yet makes fours less likely than 
even, so that both Label Independence (1) and Containment (2) hold.3 On this view, chances are 
still determined by the sizes of the favorable and unfavorable sets, but with two provisos: (i) 
‘Size’ is understood in a sense that favors the Euclidean axiom, that the whole is greater than the 
part, over Cantor’s criterion of 1-1 correspondence (cf. Mancosu 2009, Parker 2009), and (ii) 
chance is a partial two-place relation on events, rather than a total one-place function. Then 
chance relations are determined by size when the events are comparable, which is not always the 
case. Disjoint, countably infinite sets like even and odd, for example, remain incomparable. We 
could even adopt a partial, relational notion of size, so that relative size (and incomparability 
thereof) always determines relative chance (and incomparability thereof). 
 The value of making fours less likely than even (Parker claims) is not merely to preserve 
intuitions tutored by finite sets. In one respect, it makes chance a better guide to decision 
making. Suppose you are offered a chance to make one of two bets at the same cost: that the 
outcome of our drawing will be in even or that it will be in fours. If in fact the outcome is in 
fours, it is also in even, so you win on either bet.  If, however, the outcome is in even, it might 
 
3 (1) and (2) are mutually consistent in this relational context, for here we cannot assert that the 
chance of fours is some specific value X and then infer by label independence that the chance of 





not be in fours. In fact, there are infinitely many such outcomes, forming the set fours – 2, which, 
on either view, is non-negligibly likely to occur. Hence it would be irrational to bet on fours 
when one could more safely bet on even for the same price. If fours and even are assigned equal 
chances, those chances do not tell us which bet to choose, whereas if fours is taken to be less 
likely than even, the chances capture the asymmetry of such betting scenarios and related 
decisions. 
It is important that this notion of chance is not only partial, leaving some outcome sets 
incomparable, but also purely comparative. It will not do to have instead a monadic chance 
function over some proper subclass of the events. For then, label independence would force a 
poor outcome: either fours and even have the same chance, or no infinite, co-infinite set is 
assigned a chance at all.  If even one such set is assigned a chance, then by label independence, 
they all are, and they are all assigned the same chance. A function that instead assigns chances 
only to finite and co-finite sets would fail to capture the feature that the infinite, co-infinite sets 
are intermediate in chance between the finite and co-finite ones. As well, it would not give even 
greater chance than fours. Therefore, a partial, comparative chance relation is here far preferable 
to a partial, monadic chance function, for it expresses much more.  
To this one might reply, following Easwaran 2014, that a chance function need not 
express all the relative chances between proper subsets and supersets, for those are captured 
instead by the subset relations themselves. But that is just to admit that the chance function does 
not tell the whole story, nor, in this case, hardly any of it. It is only a superfluous representation 





How are we to choose between Containment (2) and Completeness (3)? We are at an 
impasse. The difference between our two views corresponds to two different ways of comparing 
the sizes of outcome sets and thus the chances these sizes dictate.4 Do we compare them by 
cardinalities and suffer the consequence that fours is as likely as even? Or do we compare them 
by the Euclidean axiom and suffer the consequence that the chances of many outcomes, such as 
even and odd, are incomparable? 
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